Tamper-Resistant Arithmetic for Public-Key Cryptography

Cryptographic hardware has found many uses in many ubiquitous and pervasive security devices with a small form factor, e.g. SIM cards, smart cards, electronic security tokens, and soon even RFIDs. With applications in banking, telecommunication, healthcare, e-commerce and entertainment, these devices use cryptography to provide security services like authentication, identification and confidentiality to the user. However, the widespread adoption of these devices into the mass market, and the lack of a physical security perimeter have increased the risk of theft, reverse engineering, and cloning. Despite the use of strong cryptographic algorithms, these devices often succumb to powerful side-channel attacks. These attacks provide a motivated third party with access to the inner workings of the device and therefore the opportunity to circumvent the protection of the cryptographic envelope. Apart from passive side-channel analysis, which has been the subject of intense research for over a decade, active tampering attacks like fault analysis have recently gained increased attention from the academic and industrial research community. In this dissertation we address the question of how to protect cryptographic devices against this kind of attacks. More specifically, we focus our attention on public key algorithms like elliptic curve cryptography and their underlying arithmetic structure. In our research we address challenges such as the cost of implementation, the level of protection, and the error model in an adversarial situation. The approaches that we investigated all apply concepts from coding theory, in particular the theory of cyclic codes. This seems intuitive, since both public key cryptography and cyclic codes share finite field arithmetic as a common foundation. The major contributions of our research are (a) a generalization of cyclic codes that allow embedding of finite fields into redundant rings under a ring homomorphism, (b) a new family of non-linear arithmetic residue codes with very high error detection probability, (c) a set of new low-cost arithmetic primitives for optimal extension field arithmetic based on robust codes, and (d) design techniques for tamper resilient finite state machines

Versatile Montgomery Multiplier Architectures

Several algorithms for Public Key Cryptography (PKC), such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, require modular multiplication of very large operands (sizes from 160 to 4096 bits) as their core arithmetic operation. To perform this operation reasonably fast, general purpose processors are not always the best choice. This is why specialized hardware, in the form of cryptographic co-processors, become more attractive. Based upon the analysis of recent publications on hardware design for modular multiplication, this M.S. thesis presents a new architecture that is scalable with respect to word size and pipelining depth. To our knowledge, this is the first time a word based algorithm for Montgomery\u27s method is realized using high-radix bit-parallel multipliers working with two different types of finite fields (unified architecture for GF(p) and GF(2n)). Previous approaches have relied mostly on bit serial multiplication in combination with massive pipelining, or Radix-8 multiplication with the limitation to a single type of finite field. Our approach is centered around the notion that the optimal delay in bit-parallel multipliers grows with logarithmic complexity with respect to the operand size n, O(log3/2 n), while the delay of bit serial implementations grows with linear complexity O(n). Our design has been implemented in VHDL, simulated and synthesized in 0.5μ CMOS technology. The synthesized net list has been verified in back-annotated timing simulations and analyzed in terms of performance and area consumption

Sequential Circuit Design for Embedded Cryptographic Applications Resilient to Adversarial Faults

In the relatively young field of fault-tolerant cryptography, the main research effort has focused exclusively on the protection of the data path of cryptographic circuits. To date, however, we have not found any work that aims at protecting the control logic of these circuits against fault attacks, which thus remains the proverbial Achilles’ heel. Motivated by a hypothetical yet realistic fault analysis attack that, in principle, could be mounted against any modular exponentiation engine, even one with appropriate data path protection, we set out to close this remaining gap. In this paper, we present guidelines for the design of multifault-resilient sequential control logic based on standard Error-Detecting Codes (EDCs) with large minimum distance. We introduce a metric that measures the effectiveness of the error detection technique in terms of the effort the attacker has to make in relation to the area overhead spent in implementing the EDC. Our comparison shows that the proposed EDC-based technique provides superior performance when compared against regular N-modular redundancy techniques. Furthermore, our technique scales well and does not affect the critical path delay

Fast Modular Reduction

It is widely acknowledged that efficient modular multiplication is a key to high-performance implementation of public-key cryptography, be it classical RSA, Diffie-Hellman, or (hyper-) elliptic curve algorithms. In the recent decade, practitioners have relied mainly on two popular methods: Montgomery Multiplication and regular long-integer multiplication in combination with Barrett’s modular reduction technique. In this paper, we propose a modification to Barrett’s algorithm that leads to a significant reduction (25 % to 75%) in multiplications and additions. 1